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The European Union (EU) has been an important player and even a 
leader in the international cooperation on climate change ever since 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was con-
cluded in 1992. EU leadership experienced a backlash at the Copenha-
gen climate change summit in 2009, followed by a slow recovery (e.g. 
Groen et al. 2012). Against this backdrop, this policy brief assesses 
the EU’s performance leading up to the UN climate conference held 
in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, focusing on three aspects: 
(1) the degree of ambition of the EU’s policy objectives, (2) the degree 
of EU goal achievement, and (3) EU engagement in the negotiations. 
EU policy objectives
In 2013, preparations for a new global climate agreement moved cen-
tre stage in the international process. Negotiations on “a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the Convention applicable to all parties” had been launched in 2011 
with a target date of 2015 for agreement, covering the post-2020 
period. The process was also mandated to address ways to enhance 
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation ambition pre-2020, in order to close 
the gap between countries’ current 2020 mitigation goals and what 
would be required to keep the increase in the average global tempera-
ture below 2° Celsius above that of pre-industrial levels. The Warsaw 
conference built on two preparatory meetings in April and June 2013 
in Bonn (as well as a number of informal gatherings). In addition to 
GHG mitigation pre- and post-2020, major agenda items concerned 
climate finance and ‘loss and damage’ associated with the adverse 
effects of climate change (e.g. suffered as a result of more frequent 
extreme weather events).
The EU’s main aim for Warsaw was to make progress towards an ambi-
tious 2015 agreement by establishing a ‘stepwise approach’ towards 
determining binding mitigation commitments for all countries. This 
EU approach consisted of four main steps: (1) The Warsaw conference 
should define the information to be presented by countries with their 
proposed mitigation commitments in order to ensure transparency, 
quantification, comparability, verifiability and ambition. (2) All parties 
should propose their mitigation commitments in 2014. (3) An interna-
tional assessment of the proposed commitments should be conduct-
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ed in light of the below-2°C objective in 2014-2015. (4) (Revised/
finalised) commitments should be inscribed in the 2015 agreement.
On pre-2020 mitigation ambition, in Warsaw, the EU wanted in par-
ticular to: intensify the examination of specific actions with high 
mitigation potential, pursued by governments and non-governmen-
tal actors outside the UNFCCC framework on energy efficiency, re-
newable energy, land-use change and forestry, etc.; urge all coun-
tries to step up their efforts and launch a related process in 2014, 
including a Ministerial meeting; and mandate the Montreal Protocol 
to phase down fluorinated GHGs (HFCs). 
On climate finance, the EU put emphasis on improving the ‘enabling 
environment’ in both donor and recipient countries (i.e. essentially 
the regulatory governance framework for providing and receiving/
using financial support), the need for a fair burden sharing among 
developed countries, and that emerging economies should also 
contribute to financing in line with their respective responsibilities 
and capabilities. Implicit in these objectives was the rejection of 
developing countries’ demands to establish clear targets for scal-
ing up financial support by developed countries towards the goal 
of US$100 billion by 2020, as agreed in Copenhagen.
 
Finally, on ‘loss and damage’, the EU wanted to continue construc-
tive discussions and hoped to further information exchange, ad-
vance observation and monitoring, and progress on institutional 
arrangements to address ‘loss and damage’. It was determined, 
however, not to accept any calls for ‘compensation’. 
The degree of ambition of the EU’s policy objectives
In analysing the degree of ambition of the EU’s policy objectives 
two points of reference are particularly relevant. First of all, we are 
interested in knowing whether such policy objectives are in line 
with the 2°C target. This reference point was of lesser relevance in 
2013 since proposals by all parties fell far short of what would be 
required to address climate change (especially as regards mitiga-
tion). The second point of reference is the degree of ambition of 
other parties: Was the EU driving the negotiations by being more 
ambitious than other parties? 
The EU’s proposed ‘stepwise approach’ towards mitigation com-
mitments for the 2015 agreement was the most ambitious and 
specific among parties, although it would hardly ensure suffi-
ciently ambitious mitigation commitments. The EU already elabo-
rated and pursued this approach proactively during the first half 
of 2013. The EU was thus the driving force in the international 
discussion (joined to some extent by smaller developed countries 
such as Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand). The US developed 
a somewhat less ambitious position with a later submission of 
proposals and a less defined assessment phase. Even progressive 
developing countries originally displayed a considerable level of 
scepticism vis-à-vis the EU proposal and/or emphasised the need 
for differentiation based on parties’ respective capabilities. The 
Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) (including China, India, 
Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, Venezuela, Bolivia and others) and 
Brazil even fiercely opposed the EU’s stepwise approach, especially 
for developing countries.
Regarding pre-2020 ambition, the EU was not more ambitious than 
others (falling short of what would be required). The EU presented 
a list of options to increase pre-2020 mitigation ambition, as did 
other parties. What divided parties was the content of the lists and 
the emphasis put on the varying elements included. Thus, while 
the LMDCs opposed new or additional developing country com-
mitments, progressive developing countries and most developed 
countries supported an increased mitigation ambition of all par-
ties. However, no country put forward its own strengthened miti-
gation commitments/actions. In this context, several developing 
countries strongly criticised the EU for an alleged lack of ambition 
because it had already nearly achieved its 20% reduction target by 
2020 and apparently did not want to progress further until 2020.
The EU’s position on climate finance in Warsaw was rather con-
servative. Developing countries requested a clear roadmap for how 
developed countries would scale up their financial support towards 
2020 and the LMDCs in particular asked for an interim target of US$ 
70 billion for 2016. However, neither the EU nor other developed 
countries were able to present the requested pathway. Despite its 
attempts, the EU did not succeed in advancing a convincing and 
ambitious narrative on how climate finance should be shaped in 
order to achieve the 2°C objective. That other developed countries 
were even less ambitious than the EU provided little comfort.
On ‘loss and damage’, the EU took a middle position. Other devel-
oped countries like Australia, the US and Canada wanted to restrict 
the issue to information sharing under the existing adaptation 
framework. At the other end of the spectrum, developing countries 
(especially small island states) requested the establishment of an 
institutional mechanism for compensation and rehabilitation. By 
making constructive proposals on how to take discussions on the 
issue forward, the EU – together with Norway – positioned itself 
comfortably in the middle of the spectrum.
Overall, the ambitiousness of the EU’s policy objectives in Warsaw 
thus varied between the major agenda items. The EU was at the 
most ambitious end of the spectrum on the 2015 agreement, es-
pecially as regards mitigation. It occupied more of a middle ground 
on pre-2020 ambition (tending towards the more ambitious) and 
‘loss and damage’ (tending towards the more conservative), while 
having a rather conservative position, with little flexibility, on cli-
mate finance. 
EU goal achievement
Analysing the extent to which the EU succeeded in achieving its 
main declared policy objectives (goal achievement) constitutes a 
core element of EU performance (Jørgensen et al. 2011). The de-
clared policy objectives of the EU are here taken ‘at face value’, 
i.e. without considering their quality and their possible strategic 
determination. Overall, the EU partially achieved its core objectives 
in Warsaw.
The EU (only) partly achieved its main objective of establishing a 
stepwise approach towards the 2015 agreement. As regards step 
1, the information to be provided by countries when submitting 
their proposals was not conclusively defined in Warsaw but should 
be identified by the next conference at the end of 2014. Concern-
ing step 2, all parties are invited to initiate or intensify prepara-
tions for their ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ and 
to communicate these contributions ‘well in advance’ of the 2015 
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conference (by the first quarter of 2015 if possible), i.e. later than 
the EU wanted. Steps 3 and 4, an assessment phase and the in-
scription of commitments/contributions in the 2015 agreement, 
may to some extent be implied, but are not mentioned. In addi-
tion, the Warsaw decision diverges from the EU objective in broad-
ening the process towards the 2015 agreement beyond a focus 
on mitigation to include other types of proposals/pledges such 
as on finance and adaptation and in talking of ‘intended nation-
ally determined contributions’ rather than ‘commitments’. Also, a 
‘non-exhaustive list of areas for further reflection’ that would have 
provided the starting point for further elaborating elements for a 
draft negotiating text for the 2015 agreement, foreseen in 2014, 
could eventually not be agreed in Warsaw. 
The EU also partially achieved its goals for the pre-2020 mitigation 
ambition gap. The Warsaw conference, in line with EU objectives, 
agreed to intensify the technical examination of opportunities for 
actions with high mitigation potential and urged (especially the 
developed) countries to step up their efforts. However, the EU did 
not succeed in sending a signal to the Montreal Protocol to phase 
down fluorinated GHGs (HFCs). An EU attempt to garner support at 
least for a ministerial declaration in Warsaw to this end had to be 
abandoned due to insufficient support from other countries.
On both climate finance and ‘loss and damage’, the EU achieved 
most of its objectives. Together with other developed countries, it 
successfully fended off developing countries’ demands, including 
in particular the request for an interim target of US$ 70 billion in 
2016. The need for preparatory work to improve ‘enabling environ-
ments’ in donor and recipient countries was highlighted. However, 
there was no agreement on any financial contributions by emerg-
ing economies. In Warsaw, several EU member states announced 
additional financial support, which especially enabled the mobilisa-
tion of US$ 100 million for the Adaptation Fund. As regards ‘loss 
and damage’, the agreed ‘Warsaw international mechanism for loss 
and damage’ operating under the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
was in line with EU objectives to advance discussions construc-
tively while preventing ‘compensation’. 
EU engagement and international context
We can expect the EU to have an impact in international negotia-
tions only if it actively tries to shape the outcome. The level and 
kind of engagement thus forms an important third element of EU 
performance. Achieving ambitious outcomes requires highly pro-
active engagement including making concrete proposals, outreach 
to negotiating partners, coalition building, offering concessions/
package deals, etc. Achieving more conservative outcomes may, 
in contrast, require less proactive engagement. Overall, the poten-
tial of such diplomatic efforts is also defined/delimited by broader 
politics, including the core interests of the EU’s partners and their 
willingness to move forward. 
The EU actively engaged in the negotiations leading up to and in 
Warsaw. The EU reached out to other parties at the negotiating 
sessions and at other relevant meetings throughout the year (Cart-
agena Dialogue, Major Economies Forum, pre-COP, etc.). It also 
launched a diplomatic demarche to other countries prior to the 
Warsaw conference in support of its main policy objectives. The EU 
furthermore made various submissions to the UNFCCC throughout 
2013 to shape the international negotiations. 
EU engagement varied, however, between the main agenda items. 
Most diplomatic effort and attention went to the 2015 Agreement. 
For example, no other party made as many submissions on the 
2015 agreement as the EU in 2013. Engagement on the issue of 
pre-2020 ambition was also high, with particular emphasis on spe-
cific elements such as HFCs. In this context, the EU was able to 
point to the proposal for the ratification of the Doha Amendment 
of the Kyoto Protocol published by the European Commission on 6 
November 2013, which should enable the EU to ratify this amend-
ment by early 2015.
As it became clearer throughout 2013 that ‘loss and damage’ would 
become a major agenda item in Warsaw, the EU tried to engage 
proactively on the issue. It was the first to make an own-initiative 
submission on the matter for the Warsaw negotiations and tried 
actively, together with Norway, to mediate between developing and 
developed countries. This bridge-building role greatly helped bring 
about agreement on the ‘Warsaw international mechanism for loss 
and damage’.
Active engagement of the EU was at a lower level regarding climate 
finance. On the one hand, the conservative nature of the EU posi-
tion meant that there was less need for proactivity. On the other 
hand, the conservative position also meant that there was indeed 
less potential for proactivity because of the lack of a positive agen-
da that could have been actively promoted. 
As in past years, the EU tried to align with progressive developing 
countries (including small island states, least developed countries, 
the African Group and several Latin American countries) to form a 
‘winning coalition’ especially as regards its stepwise approach. It 
successfully built support for this stepwise approach throughout 
2013, also among non-EU developed countries. Its constructive 
engagement on ‘loss and damage’ helped consolidate support in 
this respect among developing countries. However, these efforts 
were constrained by the limited room for manoeuvre on two fronts. 
First, the EU itself had little to offer concretely on pre-2020 miti-
gation ambition. Second, the EU had little room for manoeuvre in 
the finance debate. Financial pledges from individual EU member 
states and promises to contribute to the Green Climate Fund as 
soon as it is operationalised were not substantial enough to appeal 
to developing countries. 
The broader climate politics surrounding the Warsaw conference 
did not lend much support to the EU either. Two points are particu-
larly noteworthy in this respect. First, Japan and Australia even fur-
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ther weakened their existing 2020 targets during the Warsaw con-
ference. Japan announced at the end of the first week that it had 
downscaled its emission reduction commitment of 25% by 2020 
from 1990 levels to a 3.8% reduction from 2005 levels (equivalent 
to a 3% increase from 1990). Australia announced that it would 
not reduce GHG emissions by more than 5% below 2000 levels by 
2020, while it had previously expressed willingness to move to 
a 15 to 25% target range under certain conditions. Second, sup-
port for progressive action among developing countries was not as 
strong as, for example, during the Durban conference in 2011. In 
particular, Brazil, which had previously strengthened the progres-
sive forces, now aligned itself more with the LMDCs. In this situ-
ation, South Africa decided in the last hours of the conference to 
align with the other members of the ‘BASIC’ group China, India and 
Brazil. At the same time, several developed countries were happy 
to go along with a more minimalist outcome. Under these circum-
stances, the EU lost much of the battle over an ambitious stepwise 
approach towards a 2015 agreement.
Conclusion: Warsaw and beyond
Overall, EU performance in the international climate negotiations 
in 2013 was something of a mixed bag. The EU pursued relatively 
ambitious objectives (themselves rather modest in light of the ur-
gency of the climate challenge) on the 2015 agreement, but was 
less ambitious or even conservative on other key agenda items. It 
also only partially achieved its objectives, especially where these 
were most ambitious and arguably most decisive for climate pro-
tection. The EU was generally actively engaged in the negotiations, 
but constrained in its impact by limitations of its position and, 
especially, a rather unfavourable international context. That the 
EU, despite this mixed record, still constituted the main ‘leader’ 
on climate change mitigation in the international negotiations in 
2013 may signify the predicament of current international climate 
politics.
Our analysis leads us to expect that continued and enhanced EU 
leadership and performance in international climate politics re-
quire addressing both internal and external constraints. Interna-
tionally, the Warsaw conference has confirmed that EU impact is 
conditioned by the international context, in which the EU consti-
tutes one among several big players. The backtracking of Japan 
and Australia, the continuing low ambitions of the US and the in-
transigence of key emerging economies (India, China, Brazil) ef-
fectively curbed EU influence and effectiveness in 2013. Achieving 
ambitious goals thus requires building a leadership alliance of a 
critical mass of progressive countries. As a medium-sized power 
in international climate politics, the EU cannot pull this cart alone. 
While other countries interested in an effective 2015 agreement 
and a re-invigoration of the UNFCCC process need to assess their 
potential of pulling together with the EU, the EU has to activate 
its full climate diplomacy potential to forge a broad international 
leadership alliance. 
An indispensable core part of these efforts has to be the stepped-up 
efforts of the EU to do its homework. The stagnation of EU climate 
policy exemplified by the uncertain fate of structural measures to 
reform the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and lack of progress on 
2030 policy objectives has come to haunt the international cred-
ibility and attractiveness of the EU. Relief is only becoming more 
urgent as the international process moves towards discussing the 
actual content of 2030 targets. As Warsaw has confirmed, mitiga-
tion ambition towards 2020 will remain part of the international 
discussions as well. In addition, the pressure for the EU to enhance 
its position on climate finance increases, even though Europe is 
still digesting the fallout of the economic and financial crisis. The 
EU doing its homework on GHG mitigation ambition pre- and post-
2020 as well as climate finance seems a necessary condition, and 
thus is urgently needed, for it to exert international leadership to-
wards the 2015 agreement. In the current state of international 
climate politics, such EU leadership seems crucial for maintaining 
the prospect of a 2015 agreement that will be worth having.
References
This policy brief is also based on participant observation of the authors 
(including interviews with negotiators), EU Council conclusions, UNFCCC 
official documents, Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reports of the UNFCCC 
sessions in 2013 (April, June and November) and related news reports.
Groen, L., A. Niemann and S. Oberthür (2012) ‘The EU as a Global Lead-
er? The Copenhagen and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations’, Jour-
nal of Contemporary European Research, 8(2), pp. 173-91.
Jørgensen, K.E., S. Oberthür and J. Shahin (2011) ‘Introduction: As-
sessing the EU’s Performance in International Institutions – Conceptual 
Framework and Core Findings’, Journal of European Integration, 33(6), 
pp. 599-620.
Policy   brief • n° 2014/01
Sebastian Oberthür is the IES 
Academic Director. His research 
interest focuses on issues of 
European and international 
environmental and climate 
governance and institutions.
Lisanne Groen is a PhD researcher at 
the IES. Her main research interests 
are EU external environmental/
climate policy, the EU’s performance 
in international institutions and 
the EU as an international actor. Her PhD research 
focuses on ‘Understanding and explaining the changing 
effectiveness of the EU in the international climate 
change and biodiversity regimes’.
About the authors
